Integration of Muslims into German Society

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One of the main struggles in modern German identity revolves around the question of whether Germany defines itself as a country for immigrants or not. In 1984, in his address to the Bundestag, then-Vice Chancellor Hans-Dietrich Genscher, urging a decrease in the influx of immigrants, famously said, "Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland," translating to "We are not a country of immigration."[1] And yet, immigration to Germany has continued to flow as a result of significant humanitarian and political crises in the 1980s and 90's.

In fact, as of 2017, 10.5% of the German population is made up of foreign citizens, as compared to 6.6% in France, and 8.5% in the UK.[2] Because of the continued influx of migrants, in 2005 Germany introduced a new immigration law.[3] In this legislation, the country officially acknowledged that it had become a major destination for migrants, not only for those seeking political and humanitarian asylum, but also for those seeking economic opportunities.[4] However, implementation of this new identity as a country of immigration, and translating it into successful integration of the newcomers remains a significant challenge. This is especially true in light of the more than one million migrants accepted into Germany in 2015 and 2016 alone, under Chancellor Merkel's humanitarian immigration policy. This policy led to a huge increase in the number of migrants with a Muslim background. The latest available data place the percentage of Muslims in Germany at roughly 5.6% of the total population.[5]

There are essentially two conflicting schools of thought on how Muslim immigrants to Germany should be treated. One argument holds that the German state should officially enter into the realm of identity politics, "accommodate" Muslims, and begin a concerted effort to report positively on Muslim immigrants in Germany and on Islam, both in terms of culture and their role in the economy. This argument is based around the theory of "non-recognition," where the indifference of the German state to the migrant group's Muslim identity is seen as causing them to cling more tightly to their religion, and isolate themselves from secular German society. An active policy of recognition would also mitigate the *Islamization* of Muslim immigrants by the German media and by some native Germans, who discriminate against Muslim immigrants. However, there is a conflicting argument: namely that the policy of Multiculturalism, where each sub-culture in a society is equally and individually accommodated by the state, is impractical, and ultimately harmful to the overarching values of the society. This argument from the classical liberal tradition calls for the state to remain indifferent, so as not to overstep its bounds as a liberal institution. As such, in this paper, I examine what the role of the German state should be in order to best integrate Muslim immigrants, especially females, into German society.

Although I acknowledge that there are various Muslim nationalities and ethnic groups, I am focusing my research on the Muslim refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan as well as Turkish and Kurdish migrants to Germany during the second half of the twentieth century. The reason for this decision is that migrants from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan are the four largest migrant groups; the German government accepts roughly half of their applications for asylum.[6] For Muslim migrants of other ethnic identities, the German government rejects most of the applications unless the case is deemed a humanitarian necessity. I include Turkish and Kurdish migrants and their descendants in my research because they were part of a major migration to Germany that took place in 1960s and 1970s, and are part of the German collective consciousness when discussing immigration today.[7]

Furthermore, I examine the criteria that researchers use to define integration. These include more formal, quantitative factors, such as achievement of educational degrees, rates of employment, knowledge of the language, income, etc. and a range of less tangible factors that include viewpoints on gender roles, level of identification with German culture, role of religion in personal lives, and emotional perception of experiences with German society. I will be focusing on employment as the major indicator for integration, not least because of the exposure to the host society and culture that follow in the experience of employment. These criteria are taken from a study published by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, an independent think tank.[8] Furthermore, employment of women specifically acts as an indicator for egalitarian gender roles, and increases exposure to secular, Western values, all of which over time have the potential to mitigate the lower levels of female employment in Muslim migrant communities in Germany. The research in this paper is particularly relevant for female Muslim immigrants in Germany, as they suffer the lowest employment rates out of all ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and are, according to a number of studies, the least integrated into German society by all other indicators.[9] Therefore, the question of why this group suffers such low employment rates and is so poorly integrated, as well as how to mitigate this phenomenon, is of the utmost importance.

In researching this issue, I have come to the conclusion that although those who favor non-recognition, as well as the proponents of multiculturalism, advocate for specific and individual accommodation of Muslim identity in Germany to ensure integration, these accommodations would not only overstep the German state's boundaries as a liberal institution, but they would not be the most effective method of integration. Instead, the German government and members of society should ensure employment of Muslim immigrants in Germany, specifically of Muslim women, from which will follow their integration into other societal sectors.

Literature Review

The current state of integration of Muslims in Germany is a nuanced and complicated one, but is explained very well in Daniel Faas's essay *Muslims in Germany: From Guestworkers to Citizens*.[10] This source describes the situation in great detail, discussing such aspects as the performance of Muslim children in schools and comparing it to the performance of German children.[11] Faas cites a PISA study where the performance of children in schools was analyzed in various European countries, and found that Germany had the widest gap in performance between immigrant and native children.[12] Faas also discusses issues in society such as controversies over the headscarf.[13]

In combination with Faas's information, I found it important to investigate the economic opportunities for migrants in Germany. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted a study of the labor market integration of migrants in Germany. Thomas Liebig, the lead investigator of the study, found that Turkish migrants in Germany, in particular Turkish women, are the least employed groups in Germany.[14] These two sources provided me with a great deal of information as to the relevance of this research, and how crucial it is to improve the process of integration.

I also examined two conflicting theories of integration. The first theory, Multiculturalism, was described in Sarah Song's entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Song's entry explains the arguments for and against Multiculturalism, which I use as my counterargument. Song's entry is very valuable as it goes into great detail about the justifications for and criticisms of Multiculturalism, which helps me to rebut it. To rebut Multiculturalism, I turned to Bassam Tibi's 2002 essay *Leitkultur als Wertekonsens* ("Leitkultur as a Value Consensus"), where he clarified his term *Leitkultur*. I chose to use this paper, and not the original paper where Tibi first put forward the term, because in this one Tibi is clarifying his original intent in light of detractors criticizing the term *Leitkultur*. Because the concept of a *Leitkultur*, correctly understood as a non-ethnic, non-nationalist term denoting a societal consensus on Enlightenment-inspired, liberal-democratic values that place individual rights at the center, Tibi's essay provided valuable explanations, clarifications, and defenses.

The Importance of Work for Successful Integration

In 2009, the Berlin Institute for Population and Development conducted a study about the social and economic integration of immigrants in Germany.[15] The study established twenty criteria for measuring successful integration, including assimilation (percentage of people with German citizenship, bicultural marriages), education (percentage of people without a degree, academics, etc.), and employment (unemployment levels, youth unemployment, need for welfare, etc.).[16] The Berlin Institute defined successful integration as where, over time, the living conditions of the immigrant groups closely resembled those of German nationals, including a fourth category in the index which measured how dynamically the criteria developed over time, meaning how fast or slow the process of integration occurred in each group of migrants.[17] The study found that

immigrants of Turkish background were by far the least integrated into society according to these criteria.[18] Furthermore, the study compared regions of Germany where the labor market was able to accommodate more people, i.e. regions with financial centers, service industries, media opportunities, and research opportunities, to regions without these industries.[19] The former attracted not only qualified and educated immigrants, but also provided employment opportunities for unskilled workers, and had far higher integration indices than the latter regions.[20] This finding is crucial, as it demonstrates how critical employment is for overall integration. Not only were employment rates higher in these areas, but from that employment followed success in all the other integration criteria. This finding was confirmed by Liebig's study under the OECD. As Liebig writes:

> Although integration into the labour market does not necessarily guarantee social integration, it is certainly a major step with respect to immigrants' ability to function as autonomous citizens in the host country and with respect to ensuring both acceptance of immigration by the host-country population and the sustainability of migration policy over the long term. Labour market integration is arguably the single most important instrument for contributing to the integration of immigrants, in whatever way this term is defined.[21]

Inge Cascante, a German citizen who has a great deal of experience working in refugee centers to teach German, shares this view. Cascante sees the integration of an immigrant into German society occurring much faster through employment, where there is exposure to and interaction with the host culture, as opposed to an immigrant who does not work, and thus does not receive this same experience.[22] Cascante also stated that this is especially true for Muslim women, as they not only obtain economic independence and experience with German society through their work, but the traditional gender roles that are common in Islamic societies are broken down, and integration of the entire family follows much faster.[23] Unfortunately, said Cascante, many male Muslim immigrants do not allow their wives to participate in German lessons, which prevents many female Muslim immigrants from gaining employment, and thus integration.[24]

Ultimately, I view employment levels as the defining criterion for measuring integration. The results from the Berlin Institute and from Liebig's report demonstrate that employment acts as the stimulus for the improvement of other indicators of integration. Employment provides exposure to the host culture, demonstrates a willingness and a desire to integrate to those who might view immigrants with a more hostile view, and lends economic empowerment to the individual. Because of these reasons, raising the employment levels must be the main focus of anyone who seeks to improve the integration of Muslims in German society. As a prerequisite to successful employment, knowledge of the German language and appropriate levels of education are necessary. Based on Daniel Faas's report of the PISA study as described in the Literature Review, the improvement of education for migrant children up to the level of that of native

children is a crucial factor for integration, as education and employment are inextricably linked.

The Multiculturalist Argument and the Consequences of Non-Recognition

A multicultural society is what Sarah Song, a political theorist and professor at the University of California Berkeley, characterizes as being "associated with 'identity politics,' 'the politics of difference,' and 'the politics of recognition.'"[25] Multiculturalism calls for the recognition, valuation, and accommodation of cultural and ethnic groups, and includes in these demands that economic and political power be granted to marginalized groups.[26]

Song explains one such justification for positive accommodation to be granted to marginalized groups: that there are *de facto* "patterns of state support for some cultural groups over others."[27] The particular language of a society translates into economic advantage and higher rates of success for those who speak it, and those who cannot speak it are disadvantaged.[28] In this argument for accommodation, the intrinsic and unavoidable burdens placed on cultural groups, which translate into political and economic disenfranchisement, make it necessary for the state to intervene. The state must not only enforce anti-discrimination laws, but also provide protection and assistance to those who have been disenfranchised. Other arguments for multicultural accommodation include the liberal egalitarian definition of cultural identity as an intrinsic "good" which all individuals deserve, the communitarian argument that the community supersedes the individual in importance, and the argument that one's culture must be protected from intentional or unintentional domination or exploitation.[29] Finally, Song also describes the post-colonial idea that accommodation rectifies historical inequities.[30]

The ideas discussed by Song are mirrored in Nikola Tietze's essay *Muslims' Collective Self-Description as Reflected in the Institutional Recognition of Islam*. Tietze investigates both the theory and the practice of government policies. These can be broadly described as either limiting the role of government to seeking to protect the right to religious belief and practice for individuals, or, expanding it to recognizing Muslims as a group and thus as a collective actor in German society.[31] This latter amounts to a culturalized concept of religion, which would establish Muslims as a collective category in addition to other collectives in German society. Tietze characterizes three phases of Muslim integration into Germany, and presents the concept of "non-recognition" (i.e. where a facet of the immigrant group's identity is not recognized by the government of the host culture – in this case the Muslim identity of Turkish immigrants from the second half of the twentieth century).[32] Tietze argues that it is precisely this lack of recognition of a religious identity while in a secular culture that caused the Muslim immigrants to reestablish and increase their self-identification with Islam.[33]

Beginning in the mid 1960s, a severe labor shortage in Germany's booming postwar economy lead to a massive influx of short-term unskilled laborers from mostly rural areas

in Turkey.[34] During this time, Muslim religious identity was entirely conflated with Turkish national identity, and was neither rejected nor accepted by the German government, but was simply ignored.[35] Because no Turkish political or religious organizations were active within Germany as a collective orienting factor, the void was eventually filled by independent Islamic organizations, which Tietze characterizes as on the whole leaning towards radicalism and fundamentalism.[36]

This initial phase of "non-recognition" eventually transitioned into the second phase, where the *Gastarbeiter* were for the most part no longer transitory, because many of them had remained in Germany beyond their employment and become effectively immigrants.[37] During the second phase, Turkish immigrants made Islam a more defining element of their identity, thus increasing the visibility of Islam in German society.[38] This increased societal presence of Islam created a need for places of worship, and for the accommodation of Islam in society, such as religious education for the second generation. In the third phase, independent Islamic organizations politicized Islam and the Muslim community. The German government continued to allow private religious organizations to fill the role of providing religious accommodation and other religious resources within society.[39] The recognition by the German state of Muslim groups as a collective actor has been demanded by certain Islamic political organizations, such as the *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (Central Council of Muslims in Germany).[40]While Tietze remains relatively neutral in her essay and does not entirely support an active recognition of Muslims as a collective actor by the German state, she argues for a negotiation of recognition between the two parties. Overall, the argument for a state that actively accommodates Muslims' religious identity as a group is based around the concept that the transition from a religious society into a secular society caused Muslim immigrants to enclose themselves into tight-knit communities separate from German society as a whole.

The Limits of Government

At the center of the debate around the Multicultural argument is the role of the state. In the classical liberal view, the state would overstep its bounds as a liberal institution when it accommodates cultural or ethnic groups.[41] In this viewpoint, "cultures" are not stagnant, but constantly interacting, overflowing, and mixing with one another.[42] Thus, a single culture as such cannot be defended or "accommodated." Rather, the individual's "right to form and leave associations" is what the state must protect, through a laissez-faire approach of indifference.[43] It stands to reason that this viewpoint of culture and religious identity is a more accurate one. If one were to take the Multiculturalist argument to its logical conclusion, one would find that every single subgroup and individual migrant to Germany has their own unique set of needs and experiences that would warrant active accommodation. This is not only impractical and impossible for the German state to achieve, but, as Bassam Tibi, a sociologist of German-Arabic descent argues, harmful to the society as a whole.

Bassam Tibi first introduced the idea of a *Leitkultur* (leading culture) in the late 1990s, as a counter-argument to the Multiculturalist argument.[44] The idea of a *Leitkultur* holds that the host culture is the one that all immigrants must adhere to.[45] This concept is highly controversial. Critics assert that *Leitkultur* theory results in immigrants suffering rejection and disenfranchisement if they fail to properly assimilate. Tibi addresses this criticism in his 2002 essay *Leitkultur als Wertekonsens* ("Leitkultur as a Value Consensus"), writing that detractors of *Leitkultur* theory often critique it as imposing a hierarchy of cultures on foreigners, and of idealizing a monocultural version of German society.[46] However, Tibi clarifies the term, defining the *Leitkultur* in terms of its liberal values, and also emphasizes the necessity of a *Leitkultur* for integration, because a multicultural society, in Tibi's view, constitutes a "wertebeliebige Kultur" ("culture with arbitrary values").[47] Furthermore, Tibi differentiates between the cultural identity found in Germany, which is ethnically determined (i.e. German, and cannot be transferred to a non-German immigrant), and the constructed identity found in immigration countries such as America, where the identity is "color blind, ethnicity blind, and religion blind," but corresponds to a shared set of values.[48] Tibi writes as follows:

> Zunächst sei jedoch eine Selbstverständlichkeit für diese Diskussion erwähnt: Eine ethnische Identität kann nicht erworben werden, beispielsweise kann ein Türke nicht Kurde oder ein Deutscher kein Araber werden [2]. Aber eine zivilisatorische, an Werten als leitkulturellem Leitfaden orientierte Identität - z. B. die Identität des *Citoyen* im Sinne der Aufklärung - kann erworben werden.[49] ("First, there must a be a clarification for this discussion: an ethnic identity cannot be obtained. For example, a Turk cannot become a Kurd and a German cannot become an Arab. But, a civilizational/civic identity oriented in certain values which act as leading cultural guidelines, for example the identity of the *citoyen* in the sense of the Enlightenment, can be obtained.")[50]

Thus, Tibi argues that integration into German society requires a *Leitkultur* that is not ethnically defined but *value* defined, and specifically defined by liberal values following from Enlightenment principles, in order for an immigrant to be able to adopt that identity. Tibi's Enlightenment-based term *Leitkultur* implicitly assumes the role of government to be one that adheres to the classical liberal tradition. This means that the state must remain indifferent to group identity, and the demands of certain societal groups for specific accommodation; rather, the proper role of the classical liberal state is to ensure the individual's' basic human and democratic rights.

There is a difference between recognizing Muslims in Germany as a religious group, affording the religious institutions the same rights as established religious institutions such as Christian churches and Jewish synagogues (e.g. tax privileges), and treating a religious group as a cultural one, as is described in Tietze's essay. Granting Muslim

institutions the same rights as those granted to other institutions, and protecting the right of the individual to believe in and practice the religion of their choice does not conflict with the classical liberal state's role. In fact, it is one of its core principles. However, if the government were to enter into a policy of recognizing Muslims in Germany as a collective cultural body, as has been demanded by proponents of Multiculturalism and some Islamic organization, this carries the danger of allowing these groups to force their members, especially those in a weaker position, such as women and children, to adhere to a set of values not in line with the values that are at the core of the German Basic Law (the German constitution). While such value conflicts might not occur in all cases, recognizing a group as a collective actor instantly places the definition of the group and power over the members of the group in the hands of the spokesperson or spokespeople (often self-proclaimed). The recognition of a group would include economic and political empowerment of these group leaders, who would be in the position of defining the group's collective values and identity, which may not necessarily represent all members of the group, or even its majority.

Islamization and Discrimination Against Muslim Immigrants

An alternative reasoning for the isolation of Muslims in Germany examines the issue from the other side: namely, that the host culture rejects the immigrant group via negative political and media discourse. In *The Limits of Multicultural Tolerance*, Patricia Ehrkamp examined German newspaper articles about Muslims between 1998 and 2008, and found that the content was overwhelmingly focused on female Muslims' "oppression," and the patriarchal gender roles prevalent in Islam.[51] Ehrkamp argues that the media and politicians therefore present Islam itself as an obstacle to integration, and place the onus of change on the Muslim immigrant. In *The Muslim Makers*, Christoph Ramm seconds this viewpoint, describing how the media *islamizes* Muslim immigrants, with its preoccupation with the *hijab*, gender roles, and honor killings.[52]

However, while this may be a valid criticism of the German media and politicians in their discourse about Muslim immigrants, the situation is much more complex. A 2016 study by Serhat Karakayali and Ulrike Hamman demonstrates the other side of this "rejection."[53] In *Practicing Wilkommenskultur: Migration and Solidarity in Germany*, Karakayali and Hamman describe the tolerant and positive attitudes of volunteer workers in German refugee housing projects, and how the volunteers by and large did not view the migrants as being obligated to fully assimilate into German society. This corresponds to my personal experience in July 2016 of working in two refugee housing projects in Baden-Württemberg. The reception of Muslim immigrants in Germany by native Germans remains one that is deeply nuanced and individual for every migrant. Although Karakayali and Hamman's findings show an overarchingly positive reception of migrants by German volunteers, the experience of Haifaa Ibrahim, a Syrian migrant to Germany differs. In an interview with the New York Times, she described incidences of verbal abuse by a German man in public, and how her bus driver ignores her daily, while

greeting other passengers.[54] Haifaa attributed this to her wearing the *hijab*, and stated that she felt, "more Muslim now than I ever did at home."[55]

This phenomenon is also depicted in Synnøve Bendixsen's essay *Islam as a New Urban Identity*. In this essay, she examines what almost constitutes a subculture: young, second generation female Muslim immigrants in Berlin have increasingly turned towards Islam.[56] Notably, this form of Islam differs from that of their parents, in that the girls seek a "pure" Islam, one that is universal, rather than a "traditional" Islam, which comes burdened with the ethnic and cultural background of their parents.[57] Furthermore, Bendixsen cites a great variety of factors which seem to have pushed the girls towards seeking out Islam, including identity politics, a desire for emancipation from their parents, and the confrontation with an urban and secular society.[58] For example, Bendixsen argues that the continued "othering" of Muslim immigrants by German society and the media is a "push" factor for the turn to Islam, because in the religious community, the sense of being "abnormal" is removed.[59] On the other hand, Bendixsen also makes the case that the transition into a modernized and urban environment is a destabilizing experience where the community values of Islam offer refuge.[60]

It cannot be denied that there are myriad factors causing Muslim immigrants in Germany to feel rejected and othered by the host society. However, this still does not warrant an interventionist German state attempting to accommodate every immigrant's individual experience or adopting an active policy of accommodating Muslim migrants' group identity. To be clear, the state should not ignore direct acts of violence or abuse towards Muslim immigrants, in the same way that violence or abuse towards native Germans is not ignored. Yet, the state's role in ensuring integration must remain one of ensuring employment. As the Berlin Institute showed, employment is at the crux of integration: from it follows integration into other parts of society, which will remedy the current rejection of Muslim immigrants by some native Germans.

Perception of Muslim Immigrants as "Real Threats": The New Right

This phenomenon of othering, of *Islamization*, is compounded by the renewed rise in right-wing nationalist sentiment in Germany, most visible in the establishment of and the support for the party Alternative for Germany (AfD). The AfD has an anti-Eurozone platform, and staunchly supports closing German borders.[61] In its Manifesto for Germany, the AfD also publicly states that Islam does not belong in Germany.[62] In April 2017, AfD party chairman Alexander Gauland bashed Merkel's immigration policy, saying, "before our eyes, billions and billions of tax euros are being wasted and the social welfare state is being steered towards ruin."[63] It must also be noted that the AfD, in this same Manifesto, rejects Multicultural policies and affirms the need for a German *Leitkultur*.[64] From the AfD Manifesto, it becomes clear where the controversy over the term *Leitkultur* originated: the bastardization of Tibi's value-oriented leading culture, independent of any national or ethnic identity, into a leading culture that is centered

around national and ethnic identity and that expects all other groups to assimilate. The viewpoint expressed by the AfD is an irrational one, and one that can be explained in terms of economic fears.

In reference to the second phase of Muslim integration as described by Tietze, Daniel Faas, in his essay *Muslims in Germany: From Guestworkers to Citizens,* lends insight into the changing view of German society on the *Gastarbeiter* as a function of the state of the German economy.[65] In the initial phase, where the post-war economy was booming, Faas found that Germans had a largely positive view of the *Gastarbeiter* as a source of cheap labor.[66] However, after the 1973 oil crisis where OPEC (made up of largely Islamic nations) caused a supply shock, and Germany underwent an economic recession, Faas describes how a much harsher view on *Gastarbeiter* developed in Germany: Turkish immigrants steal German jobs.[67] In *Host Culture Acceptance, Religiosity, and the Threat of Muslim Integration: An Integrated Threat Analysis in Spain*, Croucher et al. examine a similar phenomenon in the attitudes of Spaniards towards immigrants in Spain.[68] They discuss the negative reactions of the host culture when the group perceives immigrants as "realistic threats":

> These are threats to economic, political and physical resources. When resources are limited, or when individuals think there are limited resources, and competition from others, discriminatory behavior and prejudice can emerge over this perceived threat. Historically, politicians have often linked immigrant groups to economic problems, a classic economic threat. In such situations, immigrants are used as scapegoats for the ills of the economy.[69]

Croucher et al. argue that as the perceived threat level increases, the host culture becomes less and less receptive towards immigrants.[70] Thus, Faas, as well as Croucher et al., would offer a further explanation for the lack of Muslim integration into German society, one which identifies the fear to be on the losing side in a changing economy as the driving force behind the rejection of migrants.

This can be seen in practice in such studies as *Discrimination against Female Migrants Wearing Headscarves*.[71] This study, conducted by Doris Weichselbaumer, tested the responses to identical applications for employment, where only the photo differed (a woman with a typically German name, a woman with a typically Turkish name, and a woman with a typically Turkish name wearing a headscarf in her photo).[72] Weichselbaumer found that the version of the applicant wearing a headscarf received far fewer positive results than the others, indicating a strong discrimination against Islam in German society, specifically the economic sector.[73] Ultimately, the virulent anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiment in German parties such as the AfD stems from their constituencies' economic fears about refugees' presence in Germany. Employment of Muslim refugees is therefore doubly important, as their employment would remove them from the welfare state support, whose future AfD's

Gauland is so afraid of, and begin the first step of integration into other societal sectors. While those who view the economy as a zero-sum game may still be angered by the perceived "stealing" of a job, the ultimate integration into society that will follow the higher migrant employment rate will likely mitigate the negative societal sentiment.

Conclusion

I had a vested personal interest in researching this topic: both as a German citizen, and as someone who has worked with refugees in Germany. I spent two weeks volunteering in a refugee shelter in southern Germany that was specifically designed to house Yazidi women who had been kidnapped and tortured by ISIS. Afterwards, I volunteered for another two weeks in a refugee housing project that housed refugees from various ethnic and religious groups. My goal was to help teach the refugees German, as that is the main obstacle that many refugees currently face in seeking employment and private housing. However, while there, I not only heard stories of anti-refugee sentiment, but I also witnessed the struggles the German state is facing with finding more permanent housing and employment for refugees. Also, during the month where I worked in the housing projects (July 2016), there were multiple terror attacks and incidents of violence committed by refugees throughout Germany. The public sentiment towards refugees was beginning to edge on the negative, despite my location in Baden-Württemberg, one of the richest and most pro-refugee states in Germany. As such, I was interested in researching what obstructs integration of migrants in Germany, because integration is easier said than done. I did not hope to solve the decades-long integration debate in a single research paper, but I, informed and motivated by my own personal experience, hoped to contribute my small part to the debate.

I have examined the debate between an actively accommodating, ultimately interventionist state and a liberal one, and have found that the accommodation of cultural, ethnic, and religious groups as collective actors in society is problematic because it fails to take into account that cultures are not static and cleanly defined. Cultures are intermingling and developing, especially when one culture is introduced into a new one. Furthermore, the Multiculturalist argument fails to consider where to draw the boundaries of cultural defense. At Islam? At Sunni or Shiite? The Multiculturalist argument, taken to its logical conclusion, is impractical and impossible to enact. In addition, the state is bound to a certain set of values, established in its constitution, to protect the rights of the individual. Allowing a religious group to be recognized as a nearly autonomous actor in society impedes the state's ability to protect the rights of the individuals within these groups.

Instead, I have found that Bassam Tibi's concept of a *Leitkultur*, when interpreted correctly, is the necessary path for integration, as it is based around a shared set of values that a person inside a society must adhere to, which protects against the arbitrary values of a Multicultural society. Therefore, the state must remain indifferent towards an

immigrant's specific religious and ethnic identity. However, there remains the problem that Muslim immigrants in Germany are least integrated of all migrant groups, even more so now than in the past, in the face of the vast increase in refugees and migrants from Muslim countries. This is an undeniable problem that requires a solution. Thus, if the government decides to actively promote successful integration, it should do so by promoting the employment rates of Muslim immigrants, in particular Muslim women. It should not accommodate Muslims in Germany as a collective cultural actor.

Overall, I have found that employment is at the heart of integration. Employment as a direct source of economic empowerment is not only an effective indicator for integration, but also a stimulus for other quantitative and qualitative measurements of integration. Ultimately, the most effective and necessary step for the German government and society to take at this point is a concerted effort to increase the employment and opportunities for employment that Muslim refugees have. Weichselbaumer's study, which demonstrated serious discrimination against female Muslims in the German job market, presents an immediate area needing improvement. Reducing anti-Islamic discrimination, or promoting the hiring of female Muslims, in the economic sector would be an effective first step towards this end. The state might take steps such as financial incentives for the employment of Muslim migrants, and increasing its support for German language classes. The Berlin Institute study summarized the symbiotic nature of integration, stating that the host society must ensure that the immigrant has opportunities for developing freely and living in accordance to their beliefs and desires (as long as these correspond with the law) and provide access to society, education, and the labor market.[74] However, the immigrant also has a responsibility towards their new society to make use of these opportunities, and participate in the social, economic, and political spheres of their new country.[75]

Without explicitly stating it, the Berlin Institute study based its criteria for measuring successful integration into German society around the concept of a *Leitkultur*: integration was measured in terms of how closely the migrant groups matched native Germans in terms of the twenty criteria. The controversy of the term may have contributed for this lack of explicit acknowledgement. It is important, however, that the Berlin Institute did not draw from a nationally or ethnically derived idea of a specifically German *Leitkultur*, but from a more universalist concept of certain economic, social and cultural factors. This understanding of *Leitkultur* is in line with the concept as originally intended by Tibi. I find that this understanding of a *Leitkultur*, where the leading culture is not ethnically or nationally defined, but rather is structured upon the unanimous agreement to a set of shared civic and democratic values, is ultimately the most effective and necessary for integration to occur.

[1] Wikipedia, "Hans-Dietrich Genscher," Wikiquote, accessed March 19, 2017, https://de.wikiquote.org/wiki/Hans-Dietrich_Genscher.

[2] Statistisches Bundesamt, "EU Comparison 2017: Germany and the Other Member States," Europe in Figures, last modified 2017, accessed April 30, 2017, https://www.destatis.de/Europa/EN/Country/Comparison/GER_EU_Compared.html.

[3] Jan Schneider, "Rückblick: Zuwanderungsgesetz 2005" [Reflection: Immigration Legislation 2005], Bundeszentral für Politische Bildung, accessed April 30, 2017, http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-migration/56351/zuwanderungsgesetz-2005?p=all.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Anja Stichs, *Wie Viele Muslime Leben in Deutschland?*, report no. 1865-4967, 8, 2016, accessed April 30, 2017, https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp71-zahl-muslime-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

[6] The protection quote for refugees from Syria is 98%, from Iraq is 70%, from Iran is 50%, and from Afghanistan is 55%. *Asylgeschäftsstatistik für den Monat Dezember 2016 und das Berichtsjahr 2016*, report no. 2016/12 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), 2016), 4, accessed March 19, 2017, http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Downloads/Infothek/Statistik/Asyl/201612-statistik-anlage-asyl-geschaeftsbericht.pdf;jsessionid=C9271BBDA40CB92F7559323DFE2E6289.2_cid368?__blob=publicationFile.

[7] The reader should note that the terminology for the Turkish migrants was "Gastarbeiter" which translates literally to "Guestworkers." This emphasized their original temporary status; however, the term is no longer current.

[8] Franziska Woellert, *Ungenutzte Potenziale: Zur Lage Der Integration in Deutschland* (Berlin: Stiftung Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, 2009) accessed March 5, 2017, http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Zuwanderung/Integration_RZ_online.pdf.

[9] Thomas Liebig, *The Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany*, [Page #], 2007, accessed January 16, 2017, http://www.oecd.org/els/38163889.pdf; Woellert, *Ungenutzte Potenziale*.

[10] Daniel Faas, "Muslims in Germany: From Guestworkers to Citizens?," in *Muslims in 21st Century*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (n.p.: Routledge, 2010).

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Thomas Liebig, *The Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany*, 2007, accessed January 16, 2017, http://www.oecd.org/els/38163889.pdf.

[15] Woellert, *Ungenutzte Potenziale*.

[16] The reader should note that the Berlin Institute was the first to create such an "index" of integration based on these twenty criteria. Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Liebig, *The Labour*, 9.

[22] April 29, 2017, accessed April 30, 2017.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Sarah Song, "Multiculturalism," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Zalta (Stanford University, 2016), last modified August 12, 2016, accessed March 4, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/#TolReqIndNotAcc.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Nikola Tietze, "Muslims' Collective Self-Description as Reflected in the Institutional Recognition of Islam: The Islamic Charta of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany and Case Law in German Courts," in *Islam and Muslims in Germany*, ed. Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielmann (n.p.: Brill, 2014).

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Song, "Multiculturalism,".

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Bassam Tibi, "Leitkultur als Wertekonsens: Bilanz einer missglückten deutschen Debatte" [Leading Culture as a Value Consensus: Summary of a Mistaken German Debate], *Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1-2 (2001), accessed March 19, 2017, http://www.bpb.de/apuz/26535/leitkultur-als-wertekonsens?p=all#footnodeid15-15.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] My unofficial translation.

[51] Patricia Ehrkamp, "The Limits of Multicultural Tolerance? Liberal Democracy and Media Portrayals of Muslim Migrant Women in Germany," *Space and Polity* 14, no. 1 (April 2010), accessed February 1, 2017, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13562571003737718?src=recsys&.

[52] Christoph Ramm, "The Muslim Makers," *Interventions* 12, no. 2 (July 19, 2010), accessed January 30, 2017, doi:10.1080/1369801X.2010.489692

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[55] Ibid.

[56] Synnøve Bendixsen, "Islam as a New Urban Identity?," in *Gender, Religion, and Migration*, ed. Glenda Tibe Bonifacio and Vivienne Sm. Angeles (n.p.: Lexington Books, 2010).

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] *Grundsatzprogramm Kurz* (Alternative für Deutschland, 2017), 10, accessed April 30, 2017, https://www.alternativefuer.de/programm/kurzversion/.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Alternative für Deutschland, "Alexander Gauland: Erschreckende Zahlen – Der Bevölkerungsaustausch Läuft," news release, April 5, 2017, accessed April 30, 2017, https://www.alternativefuer.de/alexander-gauland-erschreckende-zahlen-der-bevoelkerungsaustausch-laeuft/.

[64] *Grundsatzprogramm Kurz*, 10.

[65] Faas, "Muslims in Germany," in *Muslims in 21st.*

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Although the study was conducted in Spain, the theory and findings are still relevant to my research.

[69] Stephen Croucher, Flora Galy-Badenas, and Maria Routsalainen, "Host Culture Acceptance, Religiosity, and the Threat of Muslim Immigration: An Integrated Threat Analysis in Spain," *Journal of Intercultural Communication* 15, no. 35 (July 2014): 3-4, accessed March 19, 2017, https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/44278/croucherhost%20culture%20acceptance%20religiosity%20and%20the%20threat%20of%20muslim%20immigration.pdf?sequence=1.

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[73] Ibid.

[74] Woellert, *Ungenutzte Potenziale*, 10-11.

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