

**Should it be the role of the government or private sponsors
to provide for the resettlement of refugees in the United States?**

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"There is no more enduring theme in our nation's history than our tradition of compassion and humanitarian concern for the homeless or the world. The new arrivals from Indochina remind us, once again, that we are a nation of immigrants and refugees—and that much of our heritage has been built upon the lives and spirit of those who have come to our shores, seeking hope and freedom, and an opportunity to build new lives, in a new land."

- U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy, July 24, 1975¹

Introduction

The United States is a country that, in times of crisis, does not sit back. During humanitarian crises, time and time again, the United States has extended its resources in order to assist in any way the country can. So, too, does this apply to refugee crises—after World War II, during the rise of Fidel Castro's Cuba, and during the Indochina refugee crisis, the United States has continually opened its arms and stepped in to assist refugees with resettlement. Refugee resettlement has been carried out in a number of different ways throughout U.S. history, both through government programs and the private sector. It is certainly true that resettling tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of refugees in a short period of time is no easy task; refugee resettlement may require immense government funding, and it is important to ensure that these refugees do not become a public charge. As such, the United States must methodically

¹ Kennedy, Edward M. "Opening Statement before Subcommittee on Refugees on Indochina Resettlement Program." Speech, July 24, 1975.

consider how to best structure programs for refugee resettlement, maximizing the number of refugees that are allowed entry into the United States without overextending government resources and in a way such that refugees are successfully integrating into the economy. Private and public refugee resettlement programs should work in partnership with one another because it allows them to scale efforts in refugee resettlement and can look towards private sponsorship models from other countries to do so.

Resettlement Through the Private Sector

Some historians argue that refugee resettlement in the United States should be entirely the role of private organizations because it reduces the financial strain on the government and because private sponsors encourage refugees to quickly find employment. Prior to World War II, refugee resettlement in the U.S. was handled almost exclusively by voluntary agencies, commonly referred to as “VOLAGS.” The first major modern refugee crisis erupted during and following World War II, when thousands of displaced persons were granted entry into the United States. Importantly, these displaced persons (many of them refugees) were allowed entry due to the Corporate Affidavit Program of 1946, in which VOLAGS ensured that they would financially support the resettlement of the displaced persons such that they would not become a public charge.² This affidavit marked the first of many partnerships between the government and VOLAGS to support refugee resettlement into the United States; in fact, the partnership was so successful that just two years later, President Truman signed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which almost entirely offloaded the responsibility of refugee resettlement to private

² Norman L. Zucker, "Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 467, 1983: accessed through JSTOR.

organizations. For many private organizations, such as the Church World Service, this responsibility included assisting refugees with housing, employment, and basic necessities.³ Private involvement in the resettlement of refugees directly following World War II highlighted the benefit of a model relying solely on private sponsorship for two reasons: firstly, refugees would not become a public strain on the government. Especially during refugee crises, not only resettling refugees but ensuring that they are properly assisted in integration into society can become extremely costly. By offloading much of this responsibility to private organizations, the federal government can devote those resources to other public efforts. Secondly, having the private sector assume responsibility for refugee resettlement ensures that refugees are given the proper assistance to find employment and integrate into society. In the journal article *Refugee Resettlement: Models in Action*, sociology professor Michael Lanphier outlined the benefit of a system of private refugee sponsorship: “Sponsors encourage the refugee to become acquainted with the job market and to ignore for the moment other types of alternative activities which might deter him or her from this major goal... The role of refugee sponsor is temporary and instrumental.”⁴ Through a system of resettling refugees through the private sector, refugees are encouraged and given the support to quickly enter the workforce. This way, refugees do not become a public charge on the government but rather become quickly self-sufficient and actually may contribute to the U.S. economy. Nancy and David Scull got involved in refugee sponsorship through a posting by a catholic charity in the newspaper. In 1975, they housed Nga Cong and

³ Matthew La Corte and David Bier, "Private Refugee Resettlement in U.S. History," Niskanen Center, 2016, accessed March 31, 2024.

⁴ C. Michael Lanphier, "Refugee Resettlement: Models in Action," *The International Migration Review* 17, no. 1 (1983): 4–33, accessed through JSTOR, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2545922>.

Xuan Nguyen as well as their two children, who were all staying at Fort Chaffee in Arkansas at the time. As they recount, there were essentially no governmental programs to assist Ms. Cong or Mr. Nguyen with employment or English education. Luckily for them, Ms. Scull is a social worker and has great experience in helping people find jobs and was able to assist Mr. Nguyen in securing a civil engineering job. As Mr. Scull put it, “[Nancy] already started out with a large body of useful knowledge that not every person has.”⁵ As they recount, the private organizations never showed up at their door once to check in on them. This lack of sponsor training makes sense given that the private organizations were dealing with a refugee crisis of tens of thousands of refugees at the time, but this also means that without regulation, refugee sponsorship could vary greatly depending on which private organization or family ultimately ended up sponsoring them. When Cong was questioned about her English training in the United States, she reflected, “I learned English in Vietnam as a second language, but I never practiced... When we stayed in [Nancy’s] house, she tried to teach me English, but not really much... Sometimes, she would be cooking, and I would come out and say ‘What can I do, can I help you something?’ and she would say, ‘Chop the green beans, cut the lettuce.’ I understood very little.”⁶ For refugees like Cong, it certainly became more difficult to integrate into the American workforce because of her lack of proficiency in English. Having government programs directly assist refugees with English education would more readily enable refugees to integrate, yet these governmental programs would also require significant government-backed funding, which is especially difficult to provide when considering the large influx of refugees during wartime. As such,

⁵ Nancy Scull and David Scull, telephone interview by the author, Chevy Chase, MD, May 1, 2024.

⁶ Nga Cong and Xuan Nguyen, telephone interview by the author, Vienna, VA, April 30, 2024.

offloading refugee resettlement to the private sector certainly enables large scales of refugees to integrate without great financial strain on the government; however, we must also consider that private sponsorship without prominent government oversight leads to great variance in the assistance refugees are provided, perhaps some not receiving adequate assistance that they would otherwise receive from government-supported programs.

Resettlement Through Government Programs

An approach of resettling refugees entirely through government programs would allow for thorough and consistent assistance that the private sector would not be able to adequately provide. When Fidel Castro's communist Cuba brought hundreds of thousands of refugees to the United States, the U.S. government assumed significant responsibility for refugee resettlement for the first time in American history. Under President Kennedy, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) established the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP) in 1962, which was able to "implement programs of cash assistance, medical hospitalization assistance, child welfare, surplus foods, and food stamps. Federal monies helped finance education for children and adults, vocational training, student loans, and preparations for professional certification and licensure for doctors and dentists." By 1980, the CRP had assisted roughly 750,000 Cubans with refugee resettlement.⁷ It was through the use of government funding that the U.S. was not only able to resettle hundreds of thousands of refugees but also with comprehensive and thorough aid to help them integrate into American society. When comparing government-funded programs to the private sector, it is certainly true that the government has the ability to provide more comprehensive aid than voluntary agencies, which must deal with large influxes of refugees with

⁷ Zucker, "Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems."

minimal funding. When private sponsors have widely varying resources and expertise to assist in refugee integration, it becomes difficult to provide them with proper education, professional certification, and welfare benefits that government programs would be much better equipped to assist with. However, government-backed programs can be a huge financial strain on the United States—in resettling those 750,000 Cuban refugees in 1980, the U.S. government had spent an astounding \$1.4 billion.⁸ When it became overwhelmingly clear that this financial model could not be maintained, Congress made efforts to terminate the program. They initially targeted the termination of CRP for 1983, “but the Reagan administration, as part of its push for human services expenditure restraint, terminated CRP in October 1981.”⁹ As this was the first significantly government-backed resettlement program in the nation’s history, significant money was poured into the program in order to lead to its success. While it certainly helped resettle a profound number of refugees with thorough aid provided to them, the government’s later termination of the program made clear that having an entirely government-backed program to resettle refugees is far too costly. To support the Indochinese refugee crisis in 1975, in addition to aid from voluntary agencies, the federal government established welfare programs to assist refugees. In Robert G. Wright’s journal article *Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees*, he comments on the value of these welfare programs: “While many of these welfare programs are necessary, and beneficial if properly used, they often give the refugee an opportunity to postpone entry into the real world. They also raise the overall cost of the program

⁸ Julia Vadala Taft, David S. North, and David A. Ford, “Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.: Time for a New Focus,” quoted in Zucker, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems.”

⁹ Zucker, “Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems.”

enormously, and may possibly limit the number of refugees who will be allowed admission.”¹⁰

While government programs like these may provide aid to refugees that they would not otherwise receive from the private sector, its ready access also gives room for certain refugees to rely entirely on that aid, deterring them from seeking self-sufficiency. Whereas private organizations often only provide assistance for a few weeks, which strongly incentivizes refugees to find employment, welfare programs may enable refugees to abuse these systems instead of attempting to integrate into society. Wright continues, “[w]elfare offices have been overwhelmed with new applications. Since refugees' welfare costs the states nothing, once refugees are placed on cash assistance, often there is little time and less incentive to follow up on the refugees.”¹¹

Welfare programs provide a quick and simple solution to government agencies that must deal with the needs of large influxes of refugees at once. These programs, however, because they don't help refugees with integration and self-sufficiency into American society, end up being a huge financial strain on the government and, therefore, limit the number of refugees who may enter. Ultimately, government assistance to refugees may provide more comprehensive support than private organizations—aiding in English education, employment, professional licensure, Medicaid, and welfare; yet, these programs have also proved to be very expensive to maintain and may enable refugees to rely on government assistance instead of encouraging them to integrate and become self-reliant.

Partnership of Private Organizations and the Federal Government

¹⁰ Robert G. Wright, "Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees," *The International Migration Review* 15 (1981): accessed through JSTOR.

¹¹ Wright, "Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees."

The private sector and the federal government, when in partnership with one another, provide complementary assistance to refugees, proving to be a highly successful system for refugee resettlement in the United States. The government has consistently worked with the VOLAGS by giving them grants and signing agreements with them since the Cuban Refugee Program. At first, grants were only given to private organizations during refugee crises. For example, in the 1970s, the small Ugandan Asian program received grants of \$300 per capita, and the Indochinese program received grants of \$500 per capita.¹² In 1976, however, the federal government began granting the VOLAGS \$250 per capita for annual refugee admissions and later raised that amount to \$350. These grants were especially significant because they provided the basis for cooperation between the federal government and the private sector in refugee resettlement, a model the United States still uses today. During the Indochinese refugee crisis, the federal government and the voluntary agencies worked closely together, including through committees such as the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees. In a memorandum dated July 28, 1975, summarizing a meeting of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, Executive Director Roger Semerad wrote the following: “The voluntary agency representatives made brief comments on the overall resettlement program, commending the efforts of both the Task Force and of the Senate Subcommittee. It appears that a sense of cooperation and understanding has been developed... and this spirit may well have a positive impact on the expeditious completion of the refugee resettlement program.”¹³ Not only was there greater concentrated effort towards the resettlement of Indochinese refugees through a joint

¹² Wright, "Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees."

¹³ Lawrence J. Corcoran, letter to Theodore C. Marris, July 16, 1974, Theodore C. Marris Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

partnership, but voluntary agencies and the federal government also motivated one another through “cooperation and understanding.” As seen through Semerad’s comments, government agencies and the private sector together developed a hopeful and ambitious attitude towards the Indochinese refugee crisis, which enabled them to more successfully resettle refugees. The Private Sector Initiative (PSI), which was a program implemented by President Reagan in 1987, introduced the concept of cooperation through additionality. According to Jewel LaFontant-Mankarious, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, PSI was “founded on the belief that, in a time of significant constraints on all public budgets and expenditures, a privately-funded program would enable some refugees to enter and be resettled in the United States who might not otherwise be admitted because of limitations on the funded programs.”¹⁴ Essentially, the PSI created, in addition to the normal refugee quotas for each country, an “unallocated reserve” of refugee slots that could allow refugees from any region to enter so long as the VOLAGS agreed to provide for the entire cost of resettlement. The PSI proved to be highly successful: “From 1987 to 1995, at least 16,016 refugees were resettled under PSI—about 2,700 per year from 1988 to 1993.”¹⁵ Importantly, these 16,000 refugees were resettled without any federal funding. This initiative, albeit brief, highlighted the potential success when the private and public sectors work together. The government can provide ample funding for refugee programs and resettlement without overextending its resources, and the cost of any other refugee resettlement initiatives can be covered entirely by private organizations. Still, there was pushback from various groups, who argued that the program inequitably favored certain

¹⁴ La Corte and Bier, "Private Refugee Resettlement in U.S. History."

¹⁵ La Corte and Bier, "Private Refugee Resettlement in U.S. History."

immigrant populations and that it was far too difficult to enroll as a PSI organization—the program was ultimately cut short by the Clinton administration in 1996. Under the current system, pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980, the Department of State enters into agreements with the VOLAGS to assist refugees with resettlement. In this system, refugees are granted entry through a publicly funded quota allocated each year to refugees. Government programs handle the initial resettlement of refugees for their first three months in the United States and provide a number of services to refugees through contracts with the VOLAGS. These services include housing, English classes, transportation, and employment opportunities, all of which the VOLAGS can provide. It was through this system that the government was able to resettle nearly 2.9 million refugees between 1980 and 2015.¹⁶ While these numbers are substantial—and it certainly helped that the government offloaded refugee resettlement programs to the private sector—they are indeed limited by public quotas placed on refugees each year, limiting the scope in refugee assistance that the United States can provide. Refugee resettlement can most successfully operate when private organizations and the government work in collaboration with one another; the United States should revisit models like the Private Sector Initiative, broadening the extent of refugee resettlement without spending additional federal finances, in order to maximize the number of refugees who can successfully resettle and integrate into the United States.

Canadian Private Refugee Sponsorship as a Model

The United States can look towards private sponsorship models in Canada to shape how United States resettlement programs should be implemented. Canada first began to devote

¹⁶ La Corte and Bier, "Private Refugee Resettlement in U.S. History."

serious, concentrated efforts towards government programs for refugee resettlement during the Indochina refugee crisis in 1979. Canada built out the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program (PSRP), which enabled both government and individuals to work alongside one another to share the responsibility for refugee resettlement and integration. In 2022, private programs resettled around 20,000 refugees, making private sponsors responsible for close to 40% of the total refugees who resettled in Canada that year.¹⁷ This Canadian model differs tremendously from how refugee resettlement is structured in the United States. Whereas the U.S. government fixes a public refugee quota and assumes responsibility for the resettlement of all of those refugees, the Canadian model enables private organizations and individuals to be actively involved in the sponsorship of refugees. Through this model of additionality, Canada has resettled far more refugees than they would've been otherwise able to strictly using government funding; the United States implementing a similar system, echoing the previously discussed Private Sector Initiative, would enable them to broaden the scope of refugees allowed entry into the United States. Not only has refugee resettlement through the private sector allowed for the entry of more refugees into Canada but it may also have proven to be more effective in integrating refugees into the economy. According to a 2016 Canadian government report, “since 2002, [government assisted refugees] tended to have lower economic performance compared to [privately sponsored refugees]. Specifically, [government assisted refugees] had lower incidence of employment,

¹⁷ "Supplementary Information for the 2021-2023 Immigration Levels Plan," table, June 18, 2021, accessed at <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2021-2023.html>.

lower employment earnings and higher reliance on social assistance.”¹⁸ These statistics are especially significant because they not only suggest that partnering with the private sector can increase refugee admittance rates through the concept of additionality but that enabling the private sector to sponsor refugees can also lead them to better integrate into the workforce. This applies especially to the United States, who often restricted quotas for refugees out of fear of them becoming a “public charge.” As such, the United States should consider implementing a similar model to the Canadian Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, because it successfully models how the private sector can not only expand quotas for refugees without additional federal funding but also in a manner such that refugees more readily develop self-sufficiency.

Conclusion

As a nation devoted to extending a helping hand during humanitarian crises, it is the moral responsibility of the United States to assist refugees in resettlement. It is important, however, that the United States resettle refugees in a way such that they do not overextend themselves financially, as was seen with the 1962 Cuban Refugee Program. A model consisting of both private and public sponsorship, especially during wartime, would enable the United States to most successfully admit the highest number of refugees in the shortest time possible while giving them adequate resources to successfully integrate into the economy. In January 2023, the Biden Administration launched the Welcome Corps, a program allowing any group of five or more individuals—with enough funding—to sponsor a refugee to resettle in the United States. Similarly to the PSI or the Canadian private sponsorship model, this program does not

¹⁸ Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada Evaluation Division, Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs (GAR, PSR, BVOR and RAP) (N.p., 2016).

take away from government resettlement but serves as an additive to already existing government quotas for refugees. In 2022, U.S. refugee resettlement reached a record low of 25,400 entrants.¹⁹ In light of this all-time low, The Welcome Corps is certainly a step in the right direction, re-introducing opportunities for the private and public sectors to partner in sponsoring refugees. 2024 is also a presidential election year for the United States, with both candidates having polar opposite policy beliefs regarding refugee resettlement. By continuing to build out these collaborative programs through private-sector resettlement in addition to government efforts, we can maximize the scope and success of refugee resettlement efforts despite ongoing political shifts in power in the United States.

¹⁹ Migration Policy Institute, "Refugee Admissions Report," accessed at <https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/>.

Bibliography

Cong, Nga, and Xuan Nguyen. Telephone interview by the author. Vienna, VA. April 30, 2024.

I interviewed my grandparents, Xuan Nguyen and Nga Cong, on the phone to discuss their experience as refugees resettling into the United States. They evacuated from Vietnam on April 23, 1975, just before the fall of Saigon. They were staying at a refugee camp in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas when they were sponsored by David and Nancy Scull, who gracefully let my grandparents stay with them and helped them find housing. From Nguyen and Cong, I learned that they were offered essentially no government programs to assist them with integration into the U.S. In fact, for Cong, she spoke very little English and it was difficult for her to enter the workforce because of this deficiency in speaking ability. Thus, private sponsorship can vary greatly depending on the sponsor organization or individual, and the government may consider not relying entirely on private organizations because it can prevent some refugees from receiving adequate assistance in integrating into the economy. A number of historians argued that private organizations offered a number of programs to refugees, including employment assistance and English language classes. My conversation with Cong and Nguyen challenged this perception, instead demonstrating that private sponsorship can look vastly different for various refugees and that perhaps government programs would be able to mitigate that variance. It should be noted that this source only details Cong and Nguyen's personal experience, and they cannot speak on behalf of all Indochinese refugees who resettled into the United States through the private sector.

Semerad, Roger. Memorandum to John Eisenhower, memorandum, "Meeting of the U.S.

Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees," July 28, 1975. Theodore C. Marrs Files. Gerald R. Ford Presidential library.

On July 28, 1975, Executive Director Roger Semerad wrote a memorandum to Chairman John Eisenhower debriefing the meeting of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees on July 24, 1975. In the memo, Semerad notes that voluntary agencies were in attendance at the meeting and that their partnership has led to a "sense of cooperation and understanding." This source helps us better understand how the public and private sector working in unison with one another ultimately leads to more successful aid to refugees. Through partnering with one another, government agencies and the private sector can develop a hopeful and ambitious attitude towards refugee crises enabling them to more successfully resettle refugees. This memo does not go in-depth into how the voluntary agencies and government subcommittees partnered with one another, which would've been helpful in determining why a cooperative model may be more successful for refugee resettlement. Moreover, it only gives a snapshot in time, and cannot provide us with whether or not the resettlement efforts of the committee were actually successful during the Indochinese refugee crisis.

Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada Evaluation Division. Evaluation of the Resettlement Programs (GAR, PSR, BVOR and RAP). N.p., 2016.

This 2016 Canadian government report evaluated how resettlement programs (including government assisted and privately sponsored refugee programs) had been performing in 2016. In one section of the report, it found that privately sponsored refugees had higher employment rates, higher earnings, and less reliance on government welfare than government assisted refugees. These findings suggest that working with the private sector can not only increase admitted refugee numbers, but also do so in such a manner that refugee resettlement through the private sector is more successful than government funded resettlement. This source challenges the belief of historians who argue that private sector initiatives cannot successfully integrate refugees into the economy because there is not enough funding allocated for them. However, it must be noted that this is a Canadian report from 2016, and that the private organizations in Canada are likely structured much differently than private organizations in the United States, and the source should be weighted accordingly in considering the Canadian sponsorship program as a model for the United States.

Kennedy, Edward M. "Opening Statement before Subcommittee on Refugees on Indochina Resettlement Program." Speech, July 24, 1975.

On July 24, 1975, senator Edward Kennedy gave an opening speech to commence the Subcommittee on Refugees on Indochina Resettlement Program. In the speech, he begins by establishing how American values have been built on the idea of offering a helping hand during humanitarian concerns—and how these values must also apply to resettlement efforts for Indochinese refugees. This speech emphasizes the importance of the United States stepping in and providing aid for refugees abroad. It is a fundamental U.S. responsibility to assist refugees in

need, and thus, the U.S. must strategize how to most optimally structure resettlement programs (either public, private, or both) in order to best assist the most amount of refugees possible. This source does not offer much insight into whether the private or public sector should be responsible for the resettlement of refugees, and therefore does not help answer my research question in that regard.

La Corte, Matthew, and David Bier. Private Refugee Resettlement in U.S. History. Niskanen Center, 2016. Accessed March 31, 2024.

https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/old_uploads/2016/04/PrivateRefugeHistory.pdf.

This source provides a detailed summary of all refugee resettlement efforts of the private sector in U.S. history. This source especially lays out the Private Sector Initiative, which was a program implemented by President Reagan in 1987, introducing the concept of cooperation between the private and public sector through additionality. This source suggests that private organizations can serve to aid already-existing government programs to resettle refugees; instead of taking away from public efforts, the Private Sector Initiative demonstrates how private refugee resettlement can serve as an additive measure to assist more refugees. This source is limited by the fact that it only details private resettlement efforts in U.S. history up until 2016, leaving out important recently introduced programs such as the Welcome Corps in 2023 by the Biden Administration. Commentary on these more modern programs would've been helpful in determining how the U.S. should continue to proceed with both government funded and private aid to refugees in the future.

Lanphier, C. Michael. "Refugee Resettlement: Models in Action." *The International Migration Review* 17, no. 1 (1983): 4–33. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2545922>.

Michael Lanphier is a retired sociology professor at York University, who wrote a journal article titled *Refugee Resettlement: Models in Action*. In the article, Lanphier outlines the benefit of having a resettlement program structured by refugee sponsorship through the private sector. This source supports the idea that refugee resettlement should be carried out through the private sector, because refugees are encouraged and given the support to quickly enter the workforce, not relying on public welfare to support themselves. Since this article was written in 1983, it only assessed private sector efforts during the Indochinese refugee crisis and cannot provide commentary on any modern efforts to assist refugees through the public or private sector in the United States.

Migration Policy Institute. "Refugee Admissions Report." Accessed at

<https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/>.

This source is a government report on annual refugee admissions into the United States. According to the source, refugee admittance rates reached an all-time low in 2022, at only 25,400 refugees. This suggests the dire need to re-evaluate refugee resettlement programs in the United States in order to ensure that the maximum number of refugees are being granted entry into the United States. Often, refugee admittance rates fluctuate as a result of geopolitical circumstances that year or the current administration in power. This source does not provide any commentary on why refugee admit rates reached a record low, requiring us to speculate as to why that record low of refugee admits actually occurred.

Scull, Nancy, and David Scull. Telephone interview by the author. Chevy Chase, MD. May 1, 2024.

On May 1, 2024, I interviewed David and Nancy Scull, refugee sponsors to Nga Cong and Xuan Nguyen. During the interview, I learned that Mr. and Ms. Scull have sponsored a number of Vietnamese refugees and an Afghan refugee in the past. They told me that they received no formal training for how to assist the refugees they sponsored with employment or English fluency. However, Ms. Scull is a social worker by trade, and was able to assist my grandparents with integration into American society. This lack of training of refugee sponsors suggests that private sponsorship varies widely depending on the individual or organization that has sponsored the refugee and that perhaps the government should devote more resources towards refugee resettlement themselves in order to reduce this variance. It should be noted that this source only details Mr. and Ms. Scull's personal experience, and they cannot speak on behalf of all refugee sponsors or organizations who have assisted refugees with resettlement into the U.S.

"Supplementary Information for the 2021-2023 Immigration Levels Plan." Table. June 18, 2021.

<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2021-2023.html>.

This is a Canadian government report on refugee admit rates into Canada in 2022. As the report shows, private programs resettled around 20,000 refugees in 2022, making private sponsors responsible for close to 40% of the total refugees who resettled in Canada that year. This is significant because it highlights how a refugee resettlement model can be successful by

actively involving the private sector in resettlement efforts. Because of the success in resettling refugees into Canada, this source suggests that the U.S. too should implement a similar model of private sector involvement as an additive measure in order to resettle the maximum number of refugees possible. Importantly, this is a report from Canada, and private organizations in Canada are likely structured much differently than private organizations in the United States, and the source should be weighted accordingly in considering the Canadian sponsorship program as a model for the United States.

Wright, Robert G. "Voluntary Agencies and the Resettlement of Refugees." *The International Migration Review* 15 (1981). JSTOR.

This journal article written by Robert Wright details the involvement of voluntary agencies ("VOLAGS") in the resettlement of refugees prior to and during the Indochinese refugee crisis. In the article, Wright argues that by offering refugees public welfare programs, it gives refugees an opportunity to rely on that aid instead of integrating into society of their own accord. As such, Wright's opinion suggests that it may be better for resettlement efforts to be carried out by the private sector, because it prevents refugees from relying on welfare programs instead of developing self-sufficiency in the economy. Since this article was written in 1981, it only assessed private sector efforts during and prior to the Indochinese refugee crisis and cannot provide commentary on any modern efforts to assist refugees through the public or private sector in the United States.

Zucker, Norman L. "Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. JSTOR.

Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and Problems is a journal article written by historian Norman Zucker on refugee resettlement in the U.S. leading up to 1983. In the article, Zucker discusses U.S. funding for the Cuban Refugee Program, which ultimately cost the U.S. \$1.4 billion and was subsequently cut off because of that economic strain on the government. This over-extension of government resources demonstrates how resettling refugees cannot entirely be the role of government; rather, the private and public sector can work in collaboration with one another to aid refugees without putting the government in financial trouble. Since Zucker's article was written in 1983, it does not comment on any modern efforts to assist refugees through the public or private sector in the United States.